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VEGAN ISM AS AN ASPIRATION 
Lori Gruen 
Robert C. Jones 
How you cling to your purity, young man! [ ... ] All right, stay pure! What good 
will it do? [ ... ] Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk[ ... ] Well, I have dirty 
hands. Right up to the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood. 
-HOEOERER FROM SARTE'S DIRTY HANDS 
Introduction 
Most people are now aware of the extreme suffering routinely expe-
rienced by animals raised for consumption in industrialized meat 
and dairy production facilities. 1 Undercover video of some of the 
most egregious forms of cruelty have made their way to the public. 
In response, the industry has begun promoting "ag-gag" legislation, 
anti-whistleblower laws that criminalize photographing or video 
recording inside these facilities. Despite desperate efforts to con-
ceal how animals are treated, the cruel everyday practices found on 
factory farms and in slaughterhouses are no longer the industry's 
dirty little secrets. Although there is increasing awareness of the 
horrible conditions that animals endure, the vast numbers and the 
extent to which these practices impact our shared world remain rel-
atively obscure. 
1. Much of this discussion draws on Gruen's previous publications. See Gruen 2014 and 2011. 
We would like to thank Gunnar Theodor Eggertsson for important conversations that contrib-
uted to thinking about these issues. We would also like to acknowledge the generally instruc-
tive conversations that occurred at the Animals and Society and Wesleyan Animal Studies 
(AS I-WAS) Summer Fellowship Program in 2012, which helped us shape this chapter. 
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According to rhe USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, roughly 1.02 bil-
lion cattle, 1.2 billion pigs, and 40 billion chickens worldwide are raised for 
food, most on factory farms ( or what is referred to in the industry as Con-
centrated Animal Feeding Operations-CAFOs). Most of these animals 
are confined indoors for their entire lives in areas that prevent them from 
moving around; they are denied species-typical social interactions, includ-
ing raising young, who are removed at birth; and they are subjected to a 
variety of painful procedures-tails and ears are cut off and males are cas-
trated without anesthesia, animals are branded with hot irons, birds have 
their beaks sliced off with hot knives, in the egg industry male chicks are 
ground up alive, and dairy cows are forcibly impregnated regularly to pro-
duce milk. Though the normal lifespan of a chicken is approximately 10 
years, laying hens are "spent" and unable to produce eggs afi:er just 2 years, 
at which time they are slaughtered. Broiler chickens are genetically modi-
fied so as to grow to "processing" weight in only 6 weeks, at which time they 
are sent to slaughter. Slaughter ofi:en doesn't bring immediate relief from 
suffering as animals are shackled at the feet, hung upside down on a con-
veyer belt, and only occasionally are their throats slit cleanly enough that 
their deaths are instantaneous, leaving many to linger in pain, bleeding 
until they lose consciousness. 
These numbers don't include sentient beings who live in the sea. One 
source puts the number of marine animals killed for food in the United States 
alone at 51 billion (FFH, 2011 ). Common aquaculture procedures include 
taking animals out of their water environments, asphyxiating them in ice or in 
CO2-saturated water, and cutting their gills. 
As if the magnitude of animal suffering wasn't enough to cause reasonable 
people to pause and consider the pain and death they contribute to in order 
to satisfy their personal tastes, industrialized food production is responsible 
for unprecedented damage to the environment, damage that harms humans 
and other animals. In the United States alone, the cattle, pork, and poultry 
industries produce nearly 1.4 billion tons of animal waste, 130 times the 
amount of waste produced by the entire human population of the United 
States (USSCANF, 1997). These wastes end up in our waterways and under-
ground aquifers. In addition, the antibiotics fed to livestock produce 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria and resistance genes that make their way into 
ground and surface water, causing public health concerns. Most alarmingly, 
the UN conservatively estimates that roughly 18% of the total greenhouse 
gases emitted come from industrialized livestock production, more green-
house gas emissions than all the transport on earth-planes, trains, and 
cars-combined (Steinfeld, et al., 2006). 
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The costs in terms of the violence, suffering, exploitation, domination, ob-
jectification, and commodification of animals for food, the destruction of the 
environment and the displacement of animals in the process, as well as costs to 
our own health and the health of the planet, call for immediate, effective, and 
decisive action at the personal, collective, and policy levels. We support ethi-
cal veganism as an empowering response to these atrocities. Ethical veganism 
is a commitment to try to abstain from consuming products derived from an-
imals including meat, dairy, and eggs, as well as products derived from or con-
taining animal products as an ingredient. In this chapter we discuss two differ-
ent ways that people conceive of veganism,2 vegan ism as a lifestyle or identity, 
and veganism as a goal. We argue that there are conceptual and practical prob-
lems with the former, explore arguments about whether either actually makes 
a difference, and optimistically conclude that veganism as an aspiration can. 
Two Senses of "Vegan" 
Many ethical vegans sincerely adopt veganism as a lifestyle as an expression of 
their commitment to ending the suffering that accompanies the commodifi-
cation of sentient beings. Ethical vegans ofi:en see themselves in solidarity 
with one another in the struggle against cruelty and violence. Ofi:en the idea 
of veganism is accompanied by a sense that those practicing it have achieved a 
kind of ethical purity. Once one adopts a vegan lifestyle, she then has "clean 
hands" and may carry on her consumerism with a clear conscience, since no 
animals were harmed in the production of her vegan consumer goods. Some-
times seen as a kind of litmus test of one's commitment to social justice for 
animals, veganism is often thought to be the "moral baseline" for those seek-
ing to end the suffering and domination of other animals. 
Though there are debates among vegans about questions of purity and com-
mitment, there appears to be a growing public perception of vegans-that may 
be based in fact, prejudice, or more likely a combination of both-that vegans 
see themselves as better than and morally superior to non-vegans; that they can 
be "preachy;' and even annoying; that they ofi:en exhibit a kind of self-righteous 
zealotry, acting as the "vegan police" who promulgate veganism as the univer-
sal, one-and-only way to fight systemic violence against animals. Ofi:en these 
vegans are thought to judge non-vegans, including ovo-lacto vegetarians, as 
shirking their responsibility or being self-indulgent or simply cruel. 
2. Other forms of veganism are discussed in the literature as well, for example, "veganarchism;' 
"boycott vegan ism;' and ''engaged veganism." See for example Dominick 1997 and Jenkins & 
Stanescu 2014. 
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This view, rhat the only ethical way to live is to adopt a vegan lifestyle, we 
call Identity Veganism (V1). If followed strictly and universally, V1 is thought 
to keep one's hands clean. As the name implies, this sort of veganism is ofi:en 
thought of as an identity, and some people who would fall under VI have even 
claimed that they are discriminated against as vegans. These vegans have an air 
of moral certitude and moral superiority. It was perhaps proponents ofV1 that 
prompted philosopher Val Plumwood to describe vegans as "crusading 
[and] ... aggressively ethnocentric, dismissing alternative and indigenous 
food practices and wisdom and demanding universal adherence to a western 
urban model of vegan practice in which human predation figures basically as 
a new version of original sin, going on to supplement this by a culturally fa-
miliar methodology of dispensing excuses and exemptions for those too frail 
to reach their exacting moral norms of carnivorous self" (2000, p. 286). 
Of course, the VI lifestyle we are describing comes in degrees. But there is 
another sort of veganism, what we will call Aspirational Veganism (VA)' that 
views veganism not as a lifestyle or identity, but rather as a type of practice, a 
process of doing the best one can to minimize violence, domination, and ex-
ploitation. On this view, veganism is an aspiration. VA commits us to striving 
for a moral goal; VA is something that one works at rather than something one 
is. Rather than seeing veganism as a kind of universal norm to be imposed as 
a moral imperative, on this view we should instead see veganism, as ecofemi-
nist philosopher Marti Kheel suggests, as an invitation in response to the vio-
lence, exploitation, domination, objectification, and commodification that 
sentient beings endure in modern industrialized food production processes, 
part of a larger resistance to such harm and destruction (Kheel, 2004). 
We don't think that every vegan is always either a V1 or VA; there is cer-
tainly some overlap here, and in different contexts someone who recognizes 
veganism as an aspiration may also express her commitments in ways that 
make it seem more like a lifestyle. Importantly, both types of vegans oppose 
the systematic cruelty toward and destruction of other animals. However, to 
see veganism as an aspiration is not to see veganism as merely an aspiration. To 
call oneself a vegan in the VA sense while continuing consciously to act in ways 
that condone animal exploitation (for example, continuing to eat meat) 
would be to disingenuously appropriate the language of VA and act in "bad 
faith." The focus of VA is to imagine and earnestly try and actualize-to the 
best of one's ability-a world in which there is no animal exploitation, by 
working to minimize violence. While this is also a goal that VI shares, to as-
cribe moral purity and clean hands to veganism is to make a category mistake. 
In the next section we discuss why we believe this to be the case. 
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Why Vegan ism Can Only Be an Aspiration 
The belief that a rejection of industrialized livestock products allows one to 
avoid complicity in harming other animals is too simplistic and ignores the 
complex dynamics involved in the production of consumer goods of all 
kinds, global entanglements we engage with each time we purchase and con-
sume food of all sorts. Vegan diets have "welfare footprints" in the form of 
widespread indirect harms to animals, harms ofi:en overlooked or obscured 
by advocates of Vr Industrialized agriculture harms and kills a large number 
of sentient field animals in the production of fruits, vegetables, and grains 
produced for human (not livestock) consumption. As MacClellan notes, 
"large farm equipment used in the industrial agricultural production of 
staple crops such as wheat, corn, and soybeans harms many sentient field an-
imals, including members of many species of rodents such as mice and voles, 
as well as rabbits and birds," not to mention reptiles and amphibians (forth-
coming, p. 12). 
Despite wanting it to be otherwise, vegan or not, we cannot live and avoid 
killing. Living today, even for vegans, involves participating unwittingly in the 
death of sentient individuals. For example, animal products are found in or 
used in the production of a great number of consumer goods including auto 
upholstery, beer, bread, candles, chewing gum, cosmetics, cranberry juice, d~-
odorants, fertilizers, hairspray, house paint, lipstick, marshmallows, nail 
polish, plywood, perfume, photographic film, pickles, pillows, red lollipops, 
rubber, sauerkraut, shaving brushes, shaving cream, soap, soy cheese, sugar, 
surgical sutures, tennis rackets, transmission fluid, vitamin supplements, and 
wine.3 We can rail against the massive violence that is done to the huge 
number ofliving beings who did nothing to deserve their tragic fates, but nei-
ther our political commitments nor our moral outrage place us above the vio-
lent fray. All aspects of consumption in late capitalism involve harming others, 
human and nonhuman. 
One of the most troubling examples is palm oil, a ubiquitous ingredi-
ent found in a large number of prepared "vegan" food products. Produced 
by dear-cutting, palm oil plantations in Southeast Asian countries such as 
Borneo and Sumatra have nearly wiped out remaining orangutan popula-
tions while harming members of many other endangered (and non-
endangered) species. As demand for palm oil grows and as new plantations 
3. There are other products too. This is part of a list published by PETA, http ://www.peta.org/ 
living/beauty/ animal-ingredients-list/. 
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are developed in Africa, the destructive impact of palm oil may be greater 
than that of some products made directly from animal bodies or bodily 
excretions (Hawthorne, 2013 ). 
Vegans have attended to the tragedy that farmed animals experience, but 
have generally paid less attention to the harms other animals suffer in the pro-
duction of vegan foods. Thinking about consumption in a time of climate 
change may provide a clearer way to understand the ripples of responsibility. 
1hough it is hard to calculate the direct harms to humans and other animals 
from greenhouse gas emissions attributable to the agricultural sector, it is im-
possible not to contribute to these harms and still eat ( Gruen and Loo, 2014). 
T.:J be sure, vegan diets are less harmful than those that include animal prod-
ucts, but vegan diets are by no means "emissions neutral," and this is just one 
dimension upon which humans, vegan and non-vegan, negatively impact the 
earth and other animals. If we picture our responsibilities as a web, with direct 
harms at the center, vegans are certainly closer to the periphery than those 
who consume animal bodies, who kill animals, and who directly profit from 
the death of other animals, but vegans are still a part of the web, and not, as 
many practitioners ofV1 seem to believe, beyond reproach. 
Living necessitates dying and, controversially, killing. We can't live with-
out killing others or, at best, letting them die. When we live with companion 
animals, for example, other animals will have to die, most obviously to feed 
those animals. Even if they are vegan, dogs and cats will kill and eat other an-
imals if they get a chance. And when we deny them that opportunity, it be-
comes more obvious how problematic our power over them is. If we are all 
vegan, growing plants to feed ourselves and other animals involves killing 
some other animals. Even if some vegans can practice "veganic" farming, that 
is, carefully growing plants in such a way as to not harm or displace the ani-
mals who live on the land while growing enough food to share with the "deni-
zens" that may raid the fields-the vast majority of us cannot afford to create 
food in this way ( Gruen, 2014). 
Given this, veganism can be but an aspiration, and imagining oneself to be 
V1 is an illusion. 
"Humane" Killing 
One might wonder whether aspiring to VA condones purchasing locally raised 
animals who are "humanely" killed. Given that we are always implicated in the 
deaths of other animals, perhaps this recognition is what motivates young, 
affiuent (mostly white) "students" with sizable disposable incomes to spend 
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$15,000 to enroll in courses like the twelve week "full-immersion" butchery 
program at Fleisher's Grass-Fed and Organic Meats in New York. Upon grad-
uation, students are guaranteed to be able to butcher a lamb, pig, and steer. 
Tuition includes knives, "butcher's armor;' and a copy of Fleisher's 1he Butch-
er's Guide To Well-Raised Meat. Students are also encouraged to read Michael 
Pollan, Joel Salatin, 1he River Cottage Cookbook, and 1he Niman Ranch Cook-
book. Such do-it-yourself (DIY) "craft" butchery classes can be found in many 
other "foodie-friendly" cities such as Philadelphia and San Francisco. Under-
lying this booming alternative food movement is an increased awareness of 
the destructive nature ofindustrialized meat production, coupled with a sen-
timental nostalgia for a time when a majority of Americans were farmers and 
crafts persons living closer to the rhythms of the natural world. Described as 
locavorism, compassionate carnivorism, the sustainable meat movement, the 
humane meat movement, the happy meat movement, the nose-to-tail food 
movement, and the conscientious omnivore movement, these alternative food 
movements market themselves as "free range;' "grass-fed;' "organic;' "natural;' 
or "cage-free;' all of which are thought to stand in for "humane." 
Since it is difficult to deny the cruelty involved in industrial animal pro-
duction, it is promising to learn that there are growing numbers of people 
who are wary of participating directly in agribusiness. The possibility of 
"happy meat" may seem to offer an ethical alternative to the cruelty of the 
factory farm, ensuring happier lives and "humane deaths" for animals des-
tined to become meat. An interview with Joshua Applestone, owner of 
Fleisher's Grass-Fed and Organic Meats, exemplifies this core tenet of the 
"humane" meat movement: 
Q_: You were [ a vegetarian]. What caused you to become [ an omnivore]? 
JOSH: After about 6 months of running Fleisher's it was our bacon that put 
me back on a meat-eating track. My vegan/vegetarianism was an out-
growth of my beliefs about how horrible the factory-farmed meat indus-
try is. Once I really knew where my meat was coming from and how these 
animals were treated and slaughtered !could feel comfortable eating meat 
again (Applestone, 2011). 
Measured against the vast majority of consumers who are completely discon-
nected from the suffering they cause when they buy neatly shrink-wrapped 
cuts of meat, compassionate carnivores deserve some praise. Yet despite their 
supposed concern for the well-being of animals, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the actual treatment of animals on "local" farms. 
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Sadly, animals in smaller operations sometimes suffer more acutely than 
animals raised in factory farms due to lack of consistent veterinary care, given 
that such care is expensive and time-consuming for small farmers. Bohanec 
(2014) argues that when it comes to "humane" versus factory-farmed meat, 
the similarities outweigh the differences. For example, so-called "cage-free" 
eggs come from hens who, like hens raised on factory farms, experience over-
crowding, debeaking, and a terrifying slaughter. So-called "organic" dairy 
products come from cows who are artificially inseminated and kept pregnant 
their entire lives. Their calves are removed at birth, where male calves are sent 
to auction for use as veal or bee£ "Humane" meat comes from animals that, as 
on factory farms, experience tail docking, ear notching, castration, tooth-
filing, and de-horning, all without anesthesia. 
And slaughter is ofi:en done in the same way it is for animals reared more 
intensively. An overwhelming majority of animals raised on local farms are 
sent to industrial slaughterhouses, killed alongside their kin raised in indus-
trial operations. A small minority of pasture-based farmers take pains to 
ensure that the animals they raise are killed with respect. Tim Young, for ex-
ample, found a processor an hour from his Nature's Harmony Farm that kills 
9 cows a day, compared to the 400 an hour killed in large processing plants. 
Slowing down the killing process minimizes fear and helps to ensure that pain 
is minimized. When possible, Tim is present as the cows are killed. As he puts 
it, he wants to "be there to look each one of my animals in the eyes so that 
they can at least have a familiar face." It is also his way of paying his last re-
spects (Gruen, 2011).4 
In order to avoid forcing animals to endure the terror of transport to 
slaughter, another small group of farmers is hiring "mobile slaughterhouses" 
that come to the farm to kill and process the animals. These Mobile Slaugh-
ter Units (MSUs) are USDA-approved slaughterhouses-on-wheels that 
travel to small farms, slaughtering animals on-site. One of these mobile units, 
owned by Lopez Community Land Trust in Washington, is a specially 
equipped, refrigerated trailer that is pulled to the farm by a diesel truck. 
After killing the animals (5-9 cows per day), the unit then drives the car-
casses to a facility where they are cut into portions.5 Elizabeth Poett, who 
operates an organic ranch in Rancho San Julian, California, is proud to use 
4. http:/ /www.namresharmonyfarm.com/ grass-fed-meat-farm-blog/2008/2/21 /local-meat-
processor.html. 
5. Etter 2008. 
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an MSU. According to Poett, the MSU provides each of her 600 cattle with 
"more noble deaths and cut[ s] out the need for a long final slog in the back of 
a trailer to a far-off killing floor. It's a dream to be able to run this beef busi-
ness like I've been able to do it with the mobile harvest unit. I sleep better at 
night" (Adelman, 2009).6 
Though MSUs slaughter fewer animals, they share more in common with 
industrial "processing" facilities than one might imagine. Animals are stunned 
with a captive bolt gun ( or a firearm), sometimes taking two or three shots to 
render the animal unconscious. The animal's throat is then slit and the body 
hung to bleed out, be disemboweled, and dismembered (Bohanec, 2013). 
Those who aren't ready to forgo consuming animals but who are uncom-
fortable with industrialized animal production ofi:en romanticize the connec-
tion they imagine they make to the dead animals they consume. Being in-
volved in every step of production, including slaughter, creates a type of deep 
involvement that they can promote as laudable in an age when so much con-
sumption is the result of various kinds of alienation. For many "compassion-
ate carnivores:' killing and eating animals is justified by their sense of respect 
for the connection they develop with the food they eat, where personally in-
volving oneself in the death of an animal seems to provide a more direct and 
ethical way of ea:ting, one that honors the subjects of slaughter while they are 
being consumed. Killing the animals one raises is thought to generate a sense 
of humility and remind people of our interdependence with other animals. 
But this connection may be more rhetorical than genuine. One backyard 
chicken farmer who wanted to kill her rooster named Arlene describes her 
experience killing and preparing Arlene's body for consumption as being "as 
messy and mundane as cleaning the gutters:'7 
Indeed, slaughter often requires creating distance, not connectedness. 
Original Country Girl, a DIY butcher who, in giving advice to fellow DIY 
butchers on her blog, writes: 
The best advice is to always maintain a distance between you, and 
those intended for your dinner plate. This makes the butchering much 
6. Regardless of size, meat producers commonly employ the term "harvest" to refer to the 
slaughter, disembowelment, and dismemberment ( also known collectively as "preparation") of 
"livestock" and "poultry" (chickens are not considered livestock). 
7. As cited in Gruen 2011 http:/ /www.doublex.com/section/life/what-i-learned-when-i-
ki!led-chicken. 
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easier if the animal is nothing more than "the black chicken" or "the 
grey and white goose." You can care for your critters in a humane and 
respectful way without allowing attachments to form. Rule number 
one is to never give it a name. Some people can get by with ironic 
names like the ... "Christmas Dinner ... " but for others even this can 
cause trouble later on. If you know you're soft-hearted don't do it. 
Clean the pen, feed good feed, and tend any wounds but don't get too 
close. No names, no handfed treats, and no special treatment for any 
one individual animal (Mc Williams, 2011, emphasis added). 
Katie Gillespie characterizes this as "connected disconnection." She writes, 
"[a]ll of the justifications for DIY slaughter ... are enlisted to conceal what 
che process really does. DIY slaughter connects participants to the violence 
against the animal, and not to the animal him/herself This 'connection' is a 
wholly false connection" (2011, p. 120). 
Gruen (2011) argues that the problem with "humane farming" as well as 
industrial farming is that it relies on putting animals in the category of the 
edible, stripping them of their individual personalities and interests and view-
ing them as food. Being cruel to animals by causing them to suffer in factory 
farms is certainly objectionable. But animals have interests beyond suffering 
that matter as well-being allowed to live their lives with their family mem-
bers and not being killed simply to satisfy someone else's culinary desires are 
some of rhose other interests. Even if other animals are raised "humanely;' 
these interests are violated when they are slaughtered. 
Edible Entanglements 
Imagine how human interactions might be different if we saw each other as 
edible. If we allowed for the humane rearing of some humans for occasional 
consumpdon, this could lead to a breakdown in respect for one another and 
for humanity as a whole. We can already get a glimpse of the level of violence 
and disrespect that befalls those who are categorized as "disposable."8 Being 
categorized as edible, in industrial societies, renders beings as consumable 
commodities. When we allow certain "things" to be bought and sold on the 
8. Police shooting of black men along with mass incarceration rates in the United States, and 
the slaughter of genetically ill-suited zoo animals at European zoos are prominent examples of 
the dangers of categorizing others as "disposable." 
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market, we change the relationships we have and how we think of those rela·· 
tionships. We humans understand ourselves as not in the category of the 
edible, and this understanding, in part, shapes how we construct our relations 
with each other and the ways oflife we share. If we now think of our bodies 
and other people's bodies as food, the value of our bodies and ourselves 
changes. 
In response, it might be argued that since both human and nonhuman 
animals are, as a matter of fact, consumable, the problem is not that we 
ontologize animals as food, but that we ontologize animals as meat. 
Plumwood argues that refusing to allow sentient beings-including 
humans-to be categorized as edible leads to a rejection of ecological 
embodiment, since all embodied beings are food for some creature or an-
other. Plumwood advocates a distinction between food and meat, where 
"meat" represents reductionism, domination, alienation, and commodifi-
cation, while "food" suggests an acknowledgment of our ecological selves. 
As Plumwood puts it, "no being should be treated reductionistically as 
meat, but we are all edible (food), and humans are food as much as other 
animals, contrary to deeply entrenched beliefs and concepts of human 
identity in the west" (Plumwood, 2000, p. 295). To blind ourselves to 
this truth further distances and disconnects us from our ecological 
entanglements. 
But Plumwood conflates the fact that we are all consumable with the fact 
that we categorize some bodies as "edible" and others as "non-edible." The 
fact that Plumwood almost became a crocodile's supper9 and that all of us 
could be consumed as "prey" in certain contexts is an important recognition 
of our vulnerability. But this recognition is distinct from the social categori-
zation of certain others as edible. To aspire to be vegan is not to deny ecolog-
ical entanglement, but to suggest a reconceptualization of animals in their 
living bodks as fellow creatures with whom we can be in empathetic rela-
tionship and for whom we must have deeper respect (Gruen, 2015). VA can 
provide a connection to other animals and the workings of nature by en-
couraging us to recognize the ways that our choices have far-reaching 
impacts. 
While VA might avoid the charge that it disconnects humans from the 
workings of nature, it is often argued that VA is just one way, among many, 
9. To read the horrifying details of her near-fatal encounter with a crocodile, see 
Plumwood (1996). 
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to honor our environmental entanglements. Even vegans, so the argument 
goes, cannot escape the cycle of industrialized violence and destruction of 
animals and their habitats. For example, one can exclude "animal prod-
ucts" from one's diet while including foods like tofu-made from soy-
beans, produced by Monsanto, using unsustainable, environmentally de--
structive monoculture practices-and still call herself a "vegan." Therefore, 
though caring, compassionate people have good reason to engage ethically 
with animals, there is no compelling reason to privilege veganism over 
other ways of being an ethical consumer. Protesting GM Os, spreading the 
word about the devastating impacts of palm oil production, or working to 
help forest animals whose habitats are being destroyed for raw materials 
used in the manufacture of cell phones are all just as important as going 
vegan. 10 
But one needn't choose to either try to forgo the products of direct vio-
lence on the one hand or critically engage and resist industrial capitalism and 
its wide-reaching destruction on the other. Though the means of production 
of vegan foodstuffs certainly deserves scrutiny and vegans should be con-
cerned about the intersecting oppressions that food production currently en-
tails, this does not undercut the need for VA as an ethical response to violence 
against animals. One can both forgo environmentally destructive products 
that may also involve human servitude or exploitation and also refrain from 
consuming animal bodies. Though veganism is one way among many of en-
gaging ethically with animals, it does not follow that those who are well posi-
tioned to act should not do all they can to further their goal of ending vio-
lence when rhose actions don't compromise achieving comparable morally 
worthy ends. 11 
Human beings are always entangled in violence and killing, but there are 
different responses to these complex entanglements. While there is too much 
violence globally, much of it, like violence against animals, is systematic. Indi-
vidual choices and actions in the face of such mass destruction may not appear 
to do much immediately to stop the violence, but this recognition shouldn't 
obscure responsibilities to avoid causing harm. Individual animals are victims 
of mass killing and we humans are, arguably, complicit in their suffering and 
exploitation. 
10. For a more thorough discussion of this argument and its weaknesses, see Warkentin (2012). 
11. It is also important to note that eating plant-based foods is not a deprivation and is health-
ier and delicious! 
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Complicity and Impotence 
Just how responsible we are in causing suffering and harm to other animals 
when we consume their bodies produced in the industrialized system and 
what difference we might make as individuals, one way or the other, has in-
creasingly been the topic of discussion.12 One common argument used to 
reject veganism is that individually, we can't make any difference at all. If V1 
rests on a category mistake, VA rests on a goal that is impossible for anyone to 
reach. 
Consider the context in which one might refrain from eating animals-
it is usually when one decides to walk past the animal's carcass in the 
frozen-food case or the deli section of the local supermarket or butcher 
where animals are already dead. When one orders a chicken burrito at Chi-
potle rather than the tofu sofrita, the chickens aren't slaughtered-to-order, 
so buying the tofu doesn't save any particular chicken's life. The animal 
bodies in the supermarket or at the restaurant were killed days or weeks 
before any consumer even thought about purchasing them. Not purchas-
ing a chicken burrito at the particular moment you are at Chipotle would 
have absolutely no effect either way on whether chickens suffer and die in 
food production, so refraining from purchasing that chicken prevents no 
harm. 13 Agribusiness seems to be too massive to respond to the behavior of 
individual consumers. 14 
Further, consider the case of leftovers. Suppose your housemate brings 
home leftover chicken. The chicken is already dead and already cooked. Your 
housemate does not want to eat the rest of his meal. If you do not eat it, the 
meal will be thrown away. It's hard to see how your eating this leftover chicken 
could, in any way, add to the harm and misery of factory-farmed chickens, or 
fail to prevent further violence against such sentient beings. Since animals 
suffer no matter what you do, why not order or eat the chicken? With regard 
to individual actions of individual consumers, it seems veganism, particularly 
as an aspiration, is useless as a response to violence, exploitation, and 
domination. 
12. See also Kagan (2011). 
13. There is a related debate about group complicity, that is the immorality of even purchasing 
vegan food in restaurants or stores where animal products are also sold that we can't take up 
here. See Marrin (2015). 
14. For a nice overview of this causal impotence objection, see Bass (n.d.) 
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This contradicts the claim some vegans make that by forgoing products of 
cruelty, they save 95 animals every year. 15 Presumably they mean that an esti-
mated 95 animals will not be born to become someone's meal. But these 95 
indeterminate individuals aren't benefited by not being brought into exis-
tence. If you cannot harm or save a non-existent being, it seems no one is 
saved by not eating animals. In addition, as the number of people who opt out 
of animal consumption continues to increase, so too does the number of ani-
mals killed for food globally; there doesn't even appear to be a correlation 
between the overall number of animals killed for food and actual individual 
decisions to abstain from consuming animals. Given all of this, it seems that 
VA is illusory. To do what one can to refrain from consuming products that 
require the suffering and death of other animals amounts to doing nothing to 
save animals who are suffering and dying. 
But how is it possible that individual actions have no impact when it is 
clear that if everybody abstained, it would make a very large difference? Of 
course, animals would be spared lives of misery if people ceased consuming 
animal products, yet it appears that no particular animals would be spared 
lives of misery if I as an individual ceased consuming animal products. As 
Shelly Kagan puts it: 
it seems to be the case that whether or not I buy a chicken makes no 
difference at all to how many chickens are ordered by the store-and 
thus no difference in the lives of any chickens. To be sure, when hun-
dreds of thousands of us each buy a chicken this week, this does make 
a difference-for if several hundred thousand fewer chickens were sold 
this week, the chicken industry would dramatically reduce the number 
of chickens it tortures. Thus the overall result of everyone's buying 
chickens is bad. But for all that, it seems true that it makes no differ-
ence at all whether or not I buy a chicken; even ifl don't buy one, the 
results are no better (Kagan, 2011, p. 110-111). 
But how can I make no difference if together we can make a difference? If col-
lective action will have causal impact, then at least some individual instances 
must have causal impact. Collective action is not a particularly mysterious 
metaphysical category; it is some combination of individual actions that can 
15. See for example the book, Ninety-Five: Meeting America's Farmed Animals in Stories and 
Photographs, edited and published by No Voice Unheard, 2010. See also PETA (2010). 
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have a variety of impacts. In some instances a perceptible harmful result 
emerges from actions that lead to seemingly imperceptible harms. Usually, 
analyses of these types of situations reveal that though seemingly impercepti-
ble, there is nonetheless some very small impact that, when combined with 
the very small impacts of other consumers, results in harm. In the cases we are 
talking about, this seems an unsatisfying way of answering the question, given 
that the animals are already dead before I even formulate an intention to pur-
chase their bodies. Eating or not eating a dead animal doesn't causally contrib-
ute to any animal's death. 
But it may be that my action serves as a "trigger" or "threshold." 16 Sup-
pose that the butcher only makes a call to order more chickens when the 
100th chicken breast is purchased or the poultry industry only reduces pro-
duction when a threshold of 10,000 people stop purchasing chicken. It may 
seem that if you are not the one who purchases the 100th chicken breast or 
are not the 1 0,000th person who gave up chicken products, your refraining 
from such purchases makes no difference. However, your refraining affects 
the timing of slaughter or the cessation of slaughter. This is an impact, even 
if it is not a direct impact on any particular individual. So buying or not 
buying animal bodies does make a difference. Further, no matter what the 
causal impact of your refraining from consuming animal products, what is 
certain is that your not going vegan is practically certain to delay any thresh-
old event happening and therefore practically certain to result in excess 
animal suffering (Norcross, 2004). 
Recognizing one's complicity in a system of violence and deciding to stand 
against it by refusing, as far as is possible, to participate in or directly benefit 
from that system also, importantly, has effects on others. Many who work 
16. Kagan describes a triggering event in this way: 
Presumably it works something like this: there are, perhaps, 25 chickens in a given crate 
of chickens. So the butcher looks to see when 25 chickens have been sold, so as to order 
25 more. (Perhaps he starts the day with 30 chickens, and when he gets down to only 5 
lefi:, he orders another 25-so as never to run out. But he must throw away the excess 
chickens at the end of the day before they spoil, so he cannot simply start out with thou-
sands of chickens and pay no attention at all to how many are sold.) 
Here, then, it makes no difference to the butcher whether 7, 13, or 23 chickens have been 
sold. But when 25 have been sold this triggers the call to the chicken farm, and 25 more 
chickens are killed, and another 25 eggs are hatched to be raised and tortured. Thus, as a 
first approximation, we can say that only the 25th purchaser of a chicken makes a differ-
ence. It is this purchase that triggers the reaction from the butcher, this purchase that 
results in more chicken suffering. 
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toward veganism influence others to do so, and they in turn can influence 
others, and so on. 'This kind of role modeling may be understood as a species 
of the broader phenomenon of social contagion in which an action of a partic-
ular type makes another action of that type more likely. Thus veganism in-
creases the probability that others will become vegan, which increases the 
probability that the collective action of the aggregate more quickly brings 
about a reduction in the number of animals produced for food and other con-
sumer goods, decreasing animal suffering and bringing about a decrease in 
violence, exploitation, and domination (Almassi, 2011 ). 
In contrast, private actions like eating the leftover chicken when no one 
else is around ( or will ever witness or even find out about it) could increase 
the chance that one may, in the future, eat more chicken. An internal, private 
permission is generated and it may expand to other, less private, contexts. Veg-
anism urges us to conceptualize chicken or pig bodies, for example, as "not 
food;' much the way we in the United States think of dog bodies as "not 
food." As people begin to view the corpses of others as inedible, the probabil-
ity that they will want to consume "leftover" bodies is lowered. Someone as-
piring to be the kind of person who acts to minimize suffering and oppres-
sion, wherever and whenever they can, will thus adopt strategies that will 
stabilize their ability to act on their aspiration and refrain from consuming 
animal products even in private.17 
Conclusion 
People are looking for alternatives to the systemic, industrialized violence an-
imals suffer in order to become dinner. Though veganism remains an empow-
ering response to this violence, vegans need to remain realistic about the eth-
ical entanglements that accompany life in consumer culture. To believe, as 
some do, that veganism is an identity or lifestyle that gives one "clean hands" 
is to believe a myth. In contexts like ours, veganism can only be an aspiration. 
But even as an aspiration, veganism can make a difference in changing system-
atic cruelty and domination. 
17. Interestingly, when considering that role-modeling behavior can have both positive and 
negative aspects and recognize that some "negatively contagious" actions (so-called "backfire" 
role-modeling) can affect others' behavior such that it increases the probability that an ob-
server will engage in behaviors opposite to the role-modeler, we have further evidence against 
Vr If advocates ofV1 are perceived as preachy, self-righteous zealots (the "negative contagion"), 
then the effect ofV1 may very well be to push non-vegans away from veganism and toward 
meat consumption. 
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Abstaining from the use of all animal products is virtually impossible for 
most consumers in industrialized societies. Coming to think of veganism as 
an aspiration is coming to terms with the complicated impacts of our choices 
and relationships with nonhuman animals and the environment. Because it is 
non-idealized, VA forges a particularly empowering and grounded form of in-
dividual political commitment, fostering a deeper understanding ofintersect-
ing injustices and oppressions. In our experience, discussing veganism not as 
an identity or lifestyle but as an aspiration allows for meaningful discussions 
about the ways the objectification and commodification of sentient beings are 
morally problematic. Relatedly, in avoiding the rhetoric of moral purity or 
superiority, VA increases the likelihood that non-vegans will be open to em-
bracing the nonviolence that grounds veganism. Recognizing the kind of 
impact aspiring to veganism can have may strengthen one's ability to respond 
to the system of violence and improve the lives of all beings. 
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